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Katz v. United States: The Untold Story
Harvey A. Schneider*
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1967 I had the privilege of arguing Katz v. United States' before
the United State Supreme Court. I had been admitted to practice less than four
years at the time Katz was argued. To this day, after a lifetime spent in the law as
a judge and lawyer, Katz remains my seminal legal experience.
I was persuaded by the author of the preceding article that my story may
have some historical significance and should be reduced to writing. The facts in
this article do not appear in the Court's opinion and are probably known only by
me.
II. THE FACTS
In his opinion in Katz, Justice Stewart tersely delineated the operative facts
of the case. He stated only that "[a]t trial the Government was permitted, over the
petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone
conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening
and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he
had placed his calls."2 This statement is true enough, but it tells little of the whole
story. I now fill in those details.
Charles Katz was probably the preeminent college basketball handicapper in
America in 1967. He lived in an apartment building on Sunset Boulevard in Los
Angeles. On most days he would stroll from his apartment to a group of three
public telephone booths that were also located on Sunset Boulevard. Katz would
enter one of these booths and place telephone calls, usually to Miami and Boston,
during which he would transmit wagering information in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084.4
The FBI ultimately got wind of Katz's activities and set out to arrest him,
devising a rather elaborate plan to do so.' First, the agents obtained the telephone
company's consent to put one of the telephone booths out of order. Second, they
affixed an electronic listening and recording device on top and between the two
* The Honorable Harvey A. Schneider is a retired Los Angeles Superior Court Judge. He received his
undergraduate degree from the University of California, Los Angeles, and received his law degree from the
University of Southern California, where he was elected to the Order of the Coif and was Associate Editor of
the law review. Judge Schneider is currently a private judge in Los Angeles.
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 348.
3. A "handicapper" is a person who tries to predict the winner in any given competition, such as an
athletic event. Often, but not always, a handicapper bets on the events he is attempting to predict.
4. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
5. See id. at 348, 354.
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remaining booths. In this way the agents could overhear Katz's conversations
irrespective of which of the two remaining booths he used. Third, the FBI
stationed an agent outside Katz's apartment in order to observe him when he left.
Fourth, when this agent observed Katz leaving, he gave the "high sign" to
another agent who ran over and actuated the listening device before Katz entered
one of the two remaining booths. The agents' plan worked. The FBI overheard
Katz's conversations and subsequently arrested him. There was one problem with
the FBI's plan: the agents did not have a search warrant when they intercepted
6Katz's conversations.
Following his arrest, Katz was indicted in what is now the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. Katz employed attorney
Burton Marks to represent him in the district court. At the time of Katz's
prosecution, Marks was one of the most prominent, skilled, and successful
criminal attorneys in Los Angeles. In the more than forty years I have been a
lawyer and judge, I have never known an attorney who was more creative and
imaginative than he was.
His brilliance notwithstanding, Burton Marks had one small failing: he did
not always read as carefully as he should have the court papers his secretary
typed. Thus, when Marks challenged the constitutionality of the seizure of Katz's
communications in the district court, the point he wanted to make was that a man
has as much right to be let alone in a public telephone booth as in his own home.
Unfortunately, Marks' secretary typed, "a man has as much right to bet alone in a
public telephone booth as in his own home." This error, which was not
discovered by Marks before his motion was filed, caused even the staid federal
judge who presided over Katz's case to howl.
When the district court denied Marks' motion to suppress, he appealed the
judgment of conviction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court
affirmed and, in the process, held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred
because "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the
petitioner].'7
III. THE PRE-KATZ LAW
It was about this time that I went to work for Burton Marks. I had worked for
Marks one summer while I was in law school and, as a result, he was familiar
with my legal writing. He assigned me the task of preparing the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari that was to be filed in the United States Supreme Court on behalf of
Katz. Upon receiving the assignment from Marks, I immediately began reading
every relevant case I could get my hands on. My research disclosed two
6. Id. at 354-55.
7. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 40
significant lines of cases that I will refer to as the "trespass cases" and the
"constitutionally protected area" cases.
Goldman v. United States' and Silverman v. United States9 illustrate the
"trespass cases." In Goldman,
two federal agents, with the assistance of the building superintendent,
obtained access at night to Shulman's [one of the petitioners] office and
to the adjoining one. . . . They had with them. . . [a] device, a
detectaphone having a receiver so delicate as, when placed against the
partition wall, to pick up sound waves originating in Shulman's office,
and means for amplifying and hearing them. With this the agents
overheard, and the stenographer transcribed, portions of conversations
between Hoffman, Shulman, and Martin Goldman on several occasions,
and also heard what Shulman said when talking over the telephone from
his office.'°
The Government used the intercepted conversations as the basis for the
prosecution of Goldman and his confederates. In its decision, the Supreme Court
affirmed the defendants' convictions based on the reasoning, inter alia, that there
had been no trespass into the office occupied by the defendants to install the
detectaphone."
In Silverman, agents trespassed onto the defendant's property to install a
listening device called a "spike mike."' 2
The officers inserted the spike under a baseboard in a second-floor room
of the vacant house [next to Silverman's] and into a crevice extending
several inches into the party wall, until the spike hit something solid
"that acted as a very good sounding board." The record clearly indicates
that the spike made contact with a heating duct serving the house
occupied by the petitioners, thus converting their entire heating system
into a conductor of sound. Conversations taking place on both floors of
the house were audible to the officers through the earphones, and their
testimony regarding these conversations, admitted at the trial over timely
objection, played a substantial part in the petitioners' convictions. 3
8. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
9. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
10. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-32.
11. Id. at 134-35.
12. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505-06.
13. Id. at 506-07.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment
in obtaining Silverman's conversation because "an actual intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area" had occurred.
4
In the "constitutionally protected area" cases, the Court determined that a
constitutional violation had or had not occurred depending on whether the
Government conducted the search and seizure in what the Court deemed to be a
"constitutionally protected area." For example, in Rios v. United States,5 the
Court stated in a footnote that "[a]n occupied taxicab is not to be compared to an
open field or a vacated hotel room."'6 I interpreted that footnote to mean that an
occupied taxicab was a constitutionally protected area. Similarly, in United States
v. Jeffers, the Court held the defendant had a right of privacy in a hotel room
where he had stashed narcotics. 7 This suggested to me that the Supreme Court
considered a hotel room to be a constitutionally protected area.
IV. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Such was the state of the decisions when I was preparing the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari." I knew we could not argue Silverman because the FBI agents
were very careful to attach the listening device to the outside of the telephone
booths without physically penetrating the airspace of either booth. This left us
with the "constitutionally protected area" cases and, accordingly, as Justice
Stewart later pointed out in his opinion in Katz, I phrased the issues as follows:
"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected
area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening
recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation
of the privacy of the user of the booth.
"B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is
necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."' 19
14. Id. at 512.
15. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
16. Id. at 262 n.6 (internal citations to Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 (1924), and Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), omitted).
17. 342 U.S. 48,51-52 (1951).
18. Although I do not recall any specific discussions, I have no doubt I discussed the issues involved in
Katz with Burton Marks and received his input before the petition was filed. Since Marks was a far more
experienced lawyer than I, it would have been inconceivable for me not to have tapped his extraordinary legal
mind during the process of preparing the petition.
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1967) (quoting petitioners' phrasing of the issues). I
have always been miffed that, in his Katz opinion, Justice Stewart chastised the parties for the "misleading way
the issues have been formulated." Id. at 351. I formulated the issues in "constitutionally protected area" terms
because, prior to Katz, that was the language of choice the Supreme Court employed in a number of its cases.
For example, in Silverman v. United States, an opinion written by Justice Stewart himself, the Court noted
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So, the Petition was prepared and shipped to the court for filing. Then the
waiting period began. Several long months later, we had our answer. The Court
granted our Petition and requested additional briefing on the issues that it had
designated for review.' °
V. THE POST-GRANT OF CERTIORARI BRIEF
The post-grant of certiorari brief that I prepared is interesting for what it does
and does not say. In this brief, I first pointed out that after Goldman and
Silverman, the question remained whether the Court had abandoned the physical
trespass test enunciated in Goldman. I also pointed out that "[t]he confusion was
deepened by the subsequent decision in Lopez v. United States' 2' because, in that
case, the Court was unwilling to reconcile the apparent conflict between
Goldman and Silverman and, in fact, spoke about "privacy" and "unlawful
physical invasion" in almost the same breath, thus indicating that the Court had
not completely abandoned its property analysis."
I next pointed out that "the foregoing brief dissertation concerning the
judicial development of the law of search and seizure in the eavesdropping area
is of academic importance only' ' 3 since the Court's subsequent decisions
(Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden;24 Berger v. New York;2 and Camara
v. Municipal Court6) unequivocally indicated the Court's shift from a property
paradigm to a privacy paradigm and that "the primary concern of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of the individual's right to privacy.
However, even though I recognized in this brief that the Fourth Amendment
primarily protected an individual's right to privacy, - i nevertheless stated that
"[t]he crucial inquiry as applied to the instant case is, therefore, whether a public
telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that an interception of
Petitioner's calls while an occupant thereof constituted an invasion of his
constitutionally protected right to privacy.'" 9
emphatically: "But decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter
of local law. It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." 365 U.S. at
512.
20. The Court requested additional briefing on the telephone booth issue, as well as whether Katz's
papers, which had been seized at his apartment building following his arrest, were properly seized as fruits and
instrumentalities of the offense pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the
latter issue was briefed and argued by me before the Court, it was never discussed in the Court's opinion.
21. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35), 1967 WL 113605.
22. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963).
23. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11.
24. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
25. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
26. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
27. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11.
28. Id. at 11-12.
29. Id. at 12.
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I then stated:
When the now discredited physical trespass theory is abandoned in favor
of one stressing the right to privacy, it is possible to suggest a workable
test to be employed in determining whether or not a specific area is
protected by the Fourth Amendment. This test merely turns on the
answer to the question: "Does the area in question have the 'attributes of
privacy?' or, said in another way, "Would the average reasonable man
believe that the person whose conversation had been intercepted intended
and desired his conversation to be private?" Under this test the degree of
privacy afforded by a facility would be one criterion in determining the
degree of privacy protected. For example, a conversation held in a
telephone booth having a door would be entitled to more privacy, and
thus more constitutional protection, than a conversation held in an open
booth in a crowded building or area.3°
I then summarized Petitioner's position: "When examined in light of this
proposed test, there is little room for doubt that a public telephone booth with a
door [as in the instant case] is and should be a constitutionally protected area."'"
As evidenced by the brief, while I was beginning to think in terms of the
right of privacy, I was suggesting a subjective test for making that determination;
I was still focused on whether a particular communication had been intercepted
in a constitutionally protected area. Noticeably absent from the brief was any
suggestion of an objective test based on a reasonable expectation of privacy.
VI. THE EPIPHANY
After the additional brief requested by the Court was filed, the next step was
to receive the date the Court set for oral argument. Soon after that date was set
(October 17, 1967),2 1 began preparing for oral argument. Burton Marks decided
that I would give the opening argument for Katz and that he would argue in
rebuttal.
It was during my preparation for oral argument that I experienced a mind
changing event. To understand the evolution of this experience, several facts
must be kept in mind. First, since I had graduated from law school a little more
than three years before I began working on Katz, my law school experience was
still fresh in my mind. As I ruminated about the Katz case, I reflected on my
Torts class, especially the tort of negligence. I remembered we were taught that
30. Id. at 13 (citation to Lanza v. United States, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), omitted).
31. Id.
32. The Court granted each side one hour for argument, a period of time reserved for only the Court's
most important cases. See Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States, J.
KAN. B. ASS'N 25, 40 (1995) (stating that each side is permitted one half hour for oral argument and that
additional time is rarely accorded).
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negligence was doing what a reasonable man would not do or failing to do what a
reasonable man would do. We called the reasonable man TARM (The Average
Reasonable Man).
Then it hit me. We (both the Court and the attorneys) had it all wrong. The
test for determining whether Katz's communications had been constitutionally
seized was not whether the FBI agents engaged in a trespass (a theory that the
Court had already abandoned) or whether a public telephone booth was a
constitutionally protected area. Rather, the test was whether a reasonable person
33(TARM) could have expected his communication to be private. The test was an
objective one, not the subjective test that had been suggested in our post-grant of
certiorari brief. I rushed into Burton Mark's office and informed him of my
discovery. It was at this point that our entire approach changed and we began the
analysis that culminated in the oral argument before the Court.
VII. ORAL ARGUMENT
On October 16, 1967, Burton Marks, who argued before the Court in the
past, moved for my admission to the Court. This motion was granted by Chief
Justice Earl Warren. That night I got little sleep as I went over my argument time
and time again.
October 17, 1967 was a day I will never forget. It is difficult to describe the
sensation and emotion I had when Katz v. United States was called for argument
by the Chief Justice. As I approached the lectern, I looked up and saw all the
legal giants whose opinions I had studied in law school only three years before:
Warren, Black, Douglas, Harlan, White, Brennan, Stewart, and Fortas.34
Upon reading or listening to my oral argument in Katz, one will immediately
recognize how our approach evolved from the time we filed the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.3" During oral argument I specifically admitted "whether or not a
telephone booth or any other area is constitutionally protected is the wrong initial
inquiry. We do not believe the question should be determined as to whether or
not you have an invasion of a constitutionally protected area .... I also made
clear that we were proposing an objective test.
33. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the now famous "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. As explained in Peter Winn's introductory article, Justice Marshall took "no part in the consideration
or decision of this case." Id. at 359.
35. The argument can now be heard on OYEZ.com. Oyez, Katz v. United States-Oral Argument,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1 960-1969/196711967_35/argument (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
36. Transcript of Oral Argument, Katz v. United States, at 5, reprinted in 65 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
2009 / Katz v. United States: The Untold Story
Thus, when Justice White asked me a question that seemed to suggest he was
focusing on a subjective test, I responded:
I think, if I understand the import of the Court's question, the Court, or Mr.
Justice White, is suggesting a subjective test of whether or not the person
who is conducting the conversation intended his communication to be
private. And, of course, almost in every instance the answer to that will be
in the affirmative. I'm suggesting, rather, an objective test of whether a
third party, looking at the overall scene, would arrive at that conclusion."
When a member of the Court again suggested the continuing viability of the
constitutionally protected area doctrine, I responded:
I feel that the emphasis on whether or not you have a constitutionally
protected area may be placing the emphasis in the wrong place. We feel
that the Fourth Amendment and the Court's decisions recently and for a
long time have indicated that the right to privacy is what's protected by the
Fourth Amendment. We feel that the right to privacy follows the
individual and that whether or not he's in a space enclosed by four walls
and a ceiling and a roof, or in an automobile, or in any other physical
location, is not determinative of the issue of whether or not the
communication can ultimately be declared confidential. We think that the
right to privacy follows the individual and, if all the other aspects of
confidentiality are present, he's entitled to the confidentiality of his
38communication ....
I then explained to the court how we believed the reasonable expectation of privacy
test should be applied:
We propose a test using a way that's not too dissimilar from the tort
"reasonable man" test. We're suggesting that what should be used is: the
communication setting should be observed; and those items that should be
considered are the tone of voice, the actual physical location where the
conversation took place, the activities on the part of the officer; when all
those things are considered, we would ask that the test be applied as to
whether or not a third person objectively looking at the entire scene could
reasonably interpret, and could reasonably say, that the communicator
intended his communication to be confidential.39
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 11-12.
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VIII. POST ARGUMENT
After the conclusion of oral argument, I was convinced we had proposed to
the court a new test which, if accepted, would radically change the analysis of
search and seizure cases involving the interception by law enforcement officers
of a criminal defendant's oral and visual com.unications.4 The Court's opinion,
which we received two months after argument, made it clear that the Court had
accepted our test. While Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court refers to "a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone"4 ' and concludes that
the FBI agents had "violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth, ' 2 it remained for Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, to articulate the test that has become synonymous with Katz:
Whether "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy. 43
IX. APPLYING KA7TZ
Although my argument before the Court suggested how we thought the Court
should apply our objective test, it is appropriate to emphasize and amplify the
points I made during argument.
In my view, the Katz test applies whether law enforcement officers intercept
a suspect's oral communication or physical conduct. If an oral communication is
involved, I suggested during argument that a court should examine three criteria,
none of which are individually dispositive: the tone of voice utilized by the
person whose communication was intercepted, the physical location at which the
conversation took place, and the activities of the law enforcement officers who
made the interception. A few examples may help explain my view of the
application of the Katz test.
It is difficult to perceive a more private place than a person's bedroom. If,
however, a person appears at his bedroom window and speaks in a voice loud
enough for any passer-by to hear, it could easily be concluded that the person had
no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to this communication.
Moreover, as a general principle, the more activity a law enforcement officer has
to engage in to intercept a communication, the more likely, at least as to this
criterion, the communication was intended to be confidential.
40. When I returned from Washington following oral argument I was euphoric. The entire experience-
briefing and argument-had for me been a once in a lifetime experience. But the law is a humbling profession.
The very next case that I had after argument in Katz was representing a gentleman on a traffic ticket in
Inglewood, California.
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
42. Id. at 353.
43. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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One of the cases we had to contend with prior to oral argument was Hester v.
United States,44 an older case in which Justice Holmes stated that "the special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.' 45
It may be that even if the Katz test was applied to the Hester factual situation,
it could reasonably be concluded that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy since Hester and his associates engaged in conduct in
plain view of the revenue officers and the officers did not have to exert much
effort to make their observation.
I would argue, however, that a factual scenario could be envisioned in which
a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field. For
example, if a defendant went to the middle of an open field to ensure that his
communication with another person would be confidential, and law enforcement
officers were able to intercept the communication only by utilizing a
sophisticated listening device, a strong argument could be made that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to this
communication. 6
Previously, I stated that, in addition to oral communications, the Katz test
applied to visual observations made by law enforcement officers. In fact, the only
difference between the interception of a defendant's oral communications and
physical conduct is that no tone of voice is involved in the latter. Again, an
example is illustrative.
Suppose that, in Katz, instead of tape recording Katz's communications, the
FBI agents saw Katz doing something in the phone booth that had relevance to
his prosecution. Although the Court ruled that Katz's oral communications could
not be intercepted without a search warrant, it seems clear that, under my
hypothetical, what Katz did in the phone booth (which was clearly observable by
anyone passing by the booth) was fair game for the agents. Stated otherwise,
Katz could have no reasonable expectation of privacy for his conduct in a
telephone booth with a glass door. Nor would a warrant be required because
41Katz's conduct was in plain view.
In sum, it seems to me that the Katz test can be applied to the interception of
a defendant's oral communication or to the observation of a defendant's conduct.
In either situation, the focus is on the individual's right of privacy, which, as the
44. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
45. Id. at 59.
46. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where, as here, the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without
a warrant.").
47. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S 234, 236 (1968) ("[O]bjects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence."); see also United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining the plain view
test).
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Court held before Katz, is the central protection with which the Fourth
Amendment is concerned.4"
Moreover, it is clear that the Court adopted the Katz test because the advent
of modem technology (and surveillance) out-dated the property principles
underlying earlier Supreme Court decisions.49
Finally, it is important to state that Katz did not purport to render
unconstitutional all electronic surveillance. Rather, the vice of the agents'
conduct in Katz was that they intercepted Katz's communications without a
search warrant, i.e., without the intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate.
If a search warrant based upon probable cause had been obtained to listen to
Katz's communications, it is clear that the use of those communications against
50him at trial would not have violated the Constitution.
X. POSTSCRIPT
There is a postscript to Katz which the reader might find interesting and
perhaps demonstrative of human nature. When Burton Marks informed Katz of
the historic decision that now bears his name, his first response was not one of
thanks or gratitude. Rather, he wanted to know if he could sue the telephone
company for permitting the FBI agents to put the one telephone booth out of
order. And so it goes.
48. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("[Tihe principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property .... ); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)
("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society.").
49. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
50. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); see also id. at 362-63 (White, J.,
concurring).

